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ABSTRACT
Deep learning (DL) accelerators are increasingly deployed on
edge devices to support fast local inferences. However, they
suffer from a new security problem, i.e., being vulnerable to
physical access based attacks. An adversary can easily obtain
the entire neural network (NN) model by physically snooping
the GDDR (graphics double data rate) memory bus that con-
nects the accelerator chip with DRAM memory. Therefore,
memory encryption becomes important for DL accelerators
on edge devices to improve the security of NN models. Nev-
ertheless, we observe that traditional memory encryption so-
lutions that have been efficiently used in CPU systems cause
significant performance degradation when directly used in DL
accelerators. The main reason comes from the big bandwidth
gap between the GDDR memory bus and the encryption en-
gine. To address this problem, our paper proposes SEAL,
a Secure and Efficient Accelerator scheme for deep Learn-
ing. SEAL enhances the performance of the encrypted DL
accelerator from two aspects, i.e., improving the data access
bandwidth and the efficiency of memory encryption. Specifi-
cally, to improve the data access bandwidth, SEAL leverages
a criticality-aware smart encryption scheme which identifies
partial data that have no impact on the security of NN models
and allows them to bypass the encryption engine, thus reduc-
ing the amount of data to be encrypted. To improve the effi-
ciency of memory encryption, SEAL leverages a colocation
mode encryption scheme to eliminate memory accesses from
counters used for encryption by co-locating data and their
counters. Our experimental results demonstrate that, com-
pared with traditional memory encryption solutions, SEAL
achieves 1.4×−1.6× IPC improvement and reduces the in-
ference latency by 39%− 60%. Compared with a baseline
accelerator without memory encryption, SEAL compromises
only 5%−7% IPC for significant security improvement.
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning techniques, especially deep learning
(DL), have made significant progress in the past few years,
whose performances have surpassed those of humans in some
application domains, such as image classification [25, 36, 67],
speech recognition [12, 20, 76], and games [66]. With the
increase of computing performance and storage capacity of
edge devices, DL systems are increasingly expanded and
used from cloud to edge devices [19,75], such as self-driving
cars [31] and Internet-of-things devices [40]. By employing
DL accelerators, e.g., GPU and NPU, edge devices are able
to carry out real-time local inferences based on current envi-
ronments without a connection with a remote control center
with high latency. For example, over 99% smartphones are
equipped with a GPU by 2019 [63, 70]. The self-driving
computer within Tesla cars [7] and Google edge TPU [64]
also include a GPU.
In DL accelerators, neural network (NN) models are confi-
dential information that needs to be protected. Because NN
models represent the Intellectual Property (IP) of model own-
ers, which should be confidentially protected to preserve their
competitive advantages. More importantly, the knowledge
of NN models can facilitate an adversary to carry out more
powerful adversarial attacks [18, 69]. In adversarial attacks,
an adversary is able to intentionally affect the outcome of
the DL inference by modifying the input data with a slight
perturbation that is imperceptible to humans. For example, by
performing adversarial attacks, an adversary is able to manip-
ulate self-driving cars [16] and trick the speaker recognition
system in smartphones [6]. In general, if the adversary does
not know the NN model, the success rate of the adversarial
attack is low. With the knowledge of the NN model, the
success rate is significantly improved [44, 53].
However, DL accelerators deployed on edge devices suf-
fer from a new security issue compared with those deployed
on the cloud. The reason is that DL accelerators on edge
devices are easier to be physically accessed, thus being vul-
nerable to physical access based attacks. The accelerator chip
and DRAM themselves are usually well packaged and hence
secure to physical access, but the memory bus collecting ac-
celerator and DRAM is not secure, due to being vulnerable to
bus snooping attacks [27,29,30,77]. Since the DL accelerator
has to access the NN model stored in the DRAM memory
through the GDDR memory bus during the inference, an ad-
versary can easily obtain the entire NN model by inserting
a bus snooper on the GDDR bus to intercept the data com-
municated between the DL accelerator chip and the DRAM
memory. Therefore, memory encryption for encrypting the
data transmitted between the DL accelerator chip and the
DRAM memory is important.
There are two existing memory encryption models in se-
cure CPU systems including direct encryption and counter
mode encryption. Direct encryption encrypts all memory
lines by using the same global key. It has a low security
level since the same data are always encrypted to the same
ciphertext, leaving the direct encryption vulnerable to dic-
tionary and retry attacks [3]. Counter mode encryption [41]
encrypts a memory line by using a globe key in conjunction
with its line address and a per-line counter. Thus the same
plaintexts are encrypted to different ciphertexts, achieving
a high security level. Counter mode encryption needs to
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maintain a counter cache on the CPU chip. When accessing
a memory line, if its corresponding counter is found in the
counter cache, its decryption latency is hidden in the memory
read latency to improve the system performance. The reason
is that counter mode encryption generates a one-time pad
(OTP) using the counter in parallel with the memory read and
decrypts the memory line by XORing the OTP with the data.
Due to the benefit of hiding decryption latency, counter mode
encryption only incurs about 5% performance overhead in
CPU systems [77].
However, we observe that employing these memory en-
cryption techniques in DL accelerators significantly decreases
their performance. The IPC (instruction per cycle) of the
DL accelerator is reduced by over 50% after using memory
encryption, as evaluated in Section 2.4. Such a significant per-
formance decrease is unacceptable for the latency-sensitive
DL accelerators on edge devices that must carry out real-time
inferences based on current environments, e.g., self-driving
cars. The main reason comes from the big bandwidth gap
between the GDDR memory bus and the encryption engine.
For DL accelerators, e.g., GPUs, their performance is highly
bandwidth-bounded and hence the GDDR memory is de-
signed for GPUs to achieve high memory access bandwidth.
The bandwidth of the GDDR memory bus is generally higher
than 160GB/s [49, 50, 51, 52]. However, the state-of-the-art
encryption engine with hardware implementation achieves
only about 8GB/s of bandwidth on average [15,42,45,46,62].
Even though we deploy one encryption engine in every mem-
ory controller, the big bandwidth gap remains. As a result, the
high bandwidth of the GDDR memory bus is under-utilized
and the encryption engine becomes the bandwidth bottleneck
in secure DL accelerators. Moreover, since the data access
bandwidth is the performance bottleneck, counter mode en-
cryption causing extra memory accesses from counters ex-
acerbates the performance on DL accelerators, which even
delivers worse performance than direct encryption.
To address these problems, our paper proposes SEAL1, a
Secure and Efficient Accelerator scheme for deep Learning
to enhance the security of DL accelerators on edge devices
while delivering a high performance. SEAL reduces the per-
formance overhead of encryption by using a criticality-aware
smart encryption (SE) scheme and a colocation mode en-
cryption (ColoE) scheme. Specifically, to improve the data
access bandwidth of DL accelerators, SEAL leverages the
SE scheme to identify partial data having no impact on the
security of NN models and allow them to bypass the encryp-
tion engine, lowering the amount of data to be encrypted
without affecting security. To improve the efficiency of mem-
ory encryption, SEAL leverages the ColoE scheme that co-
locates the storage of each data and its counter. ColoE has the
same security level as the traditional counter mode encryp-
tion while achieving higher performance in DL accelerators
due to removing extra memory accesses from counters. In
summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• Observations and Insights on Securing DL Accelera-
tors. We present the new security problem of DL accelerators
on edge devices, i.e., being vulnerable to physical access
based attacks. We observe that memory encryption that has
1SEAL means we seal NN models in secure DL accelerators and
thus no one can snoop them.
been efficiently used in CPU systems causes significant (up
to 50%) performance degradation when being directly used
in DL accelerators. By analyzing experimental results, we
present the insights that the big bandwidth gap between the
GDDR bus and the encryption engine is the main reason of
causing performance degradation.
•Criticality-aware Smart Encryption for NNModels. We
propose a criticality-aware smart encryption (SE) scheme to
allow partial data to bypass the encryption engine for improv-
ing the data access bandwidth in DL accelerators without any
loss of security. The idea of the SE scheme is to measure the
relative importance of weight parameters in the NN model.
Based on the relative importance, the SE scheme does not
encrypt these weight parameters with the lowest importance,
and thus it is unnecessary to encrypt their corresponding
channels in the input or output feature maps. Based on the
quantitative security evaluation in terms of both IP protection
and adversarial attacks [17, 18, 37, 55], we determine the per-
centage of encrypted data with which the SE scheme achieves
the same security level as the full encryption scheme.
• Colocation Mode Encryption for DL Accelerators. In
order to improve the efficiency of memory encryption, we
propose a colocation mode encryption (ColoE) scheme to
store the data and its counter in the same memory line, un-
like the traditional counter mode encryption storing them
separately. Thus the ColoE scheme removes extra memory
accesses from counters to improve the system performance
and does not need a large on-chip counter cache compared
with the traditional counter mode encryption. Due to the
usage of counters for encryption, the ColoE scheme also has
higher security level than traditional direct encryption.
• Implementation and Evaluation. We have implemented
SEAL in GPGPU-Sim [5] and evaluated it using three clas-
sical CNN models including VGG-16 [67], ResNet-18 [25],
and ResNet-34 [25]. Experimental results show that, com-
pared with traditional direct and counter mode encryption,
SEAL achieves 1.4×−1.6× IPC improvement and 39%−
60% of latency reduction. Compared with a baseline acceler-
ator without memory encryption, SEAL is able to improve
the security with a slight overhead ( 5%−7% IPC).
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
2.1 Deep Learning Accelerators
Deep learning (DL) [38] is widely used in current artificial
intelligence applications, such as natural language process-
ing, speech recognition, and computer vision. Achieving
high accuracy and low processing latency in these applica-
tions requires complicated deep learning computation [25,67].
Therefore, various DL hardware accelerators [9,10,11,33,51]
are used to deliver high performance.
GPU is the most widely used DL accelerator due to com-
patibility with different algorithms and high parallelism. The
powerful parallel processing ability of GPU is efficient and
suitable for DL with a large amount of parallel floating-point
and matrix/vector multiplication computation. FPGA is an
alternative for implementing DL accelerators with energy
efficiency. Furthermore, various ASIC DL accelerators are
proposed to speed up special machine learning algorithms,
such as TPU [33], DianNao family [9, 11], and Eyeriss [10].
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Figure 1: The generic DL accelerator architecture.
A generic hardware architecture for these GPU, FPGA,
and ASIC DL accelerators is shown in Figure 1. The acceler-
ator architecture consists of an array of processing elements
(PEs, or called cores in GPUs) and a data cache (or called
global buffer) on chip. Each PE has its own control logic and
scratchpad, and communicates with the data cache through
network-on-chips (NoCs). As the size of the on-chip data
cache is limited, the entire NN model and the intermediate
data produced during DL inference are stored in the off-chip
DRAM memory with large capacity. The accelerator accesses
the DRAM through the high-bandwidth GDDR bus.
2.2 Threat Model and Purposes
For DL applications, neural network (NN) models are
critical data maintained in DL accelerators [29,30]. However,
DL accelerators deployed on edge devices have the risk of
leaking their NN models due to being vulnerable to physical
access based attacks. Compared with devices deployed in
the cloud, edge devices are easier to be physically accessed.
For example, a user can dismantle his/her own self-driving
car to look into the internal computer system. Therefore, DL
accelerators on edge devices have the security vulnerability
to physical access based attacks, i.e., bus snooping [65, 77].
Threat Model: Like existing threat models for hardware
attacks on CPUs [65, 77] and accelerators [29, 30], we con-
sider on-chip components of accelerators and DRAM are
secure. However, an adversary can insert a bus snooper or a
memory scanner on the GDDR memory bus2 to obtain the
data communicated between the accelerator chip and off-chip
DRAM [29, 30], and further steals the entire NN model.
Threat Purposes: We consider two threat purposes that
an adversary obtains NN models via bus snooping.
1) IP Strealing. NN models are considered as the Intel-
lectual Property (IP) of model owners [30, 60, 72]. Model
owners may consume a large amount of financial and material
resources to train a sophisticated NN model. The adversary
may be a business competitor of model owners. The leakage
of NN models incurs the property loss of model owners and
reduces their competitive advantages.
2) Adversarial Attacks. The exposion of an NN model can
significantly increase the risk that the NN model is attacked
by adversarial attacks. In adversarial attacks, an adversary
aims to apply an imperceptible non-random perturbation on
the input data to change the prediction results of NN mod-
els [18,69]. The perturbed input data are termed as adversarial
examples. If the adversary does not know the NN model, the
adversarial attack is called black-box attack. If the adversary
knows the entire NN model, the adversarial attack is called
white-box attack. In the black-box attacks, the attack suc-
2As we aim to protect the confidentiality of NN models, bus tam-
pering attacks are not considered in our threat model that can be
defended via Merkle Trees based authentication techniques [68],
which are orthogonal to our work.
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Figure 2: Encryption and decryption operations in the
direct encryption and counter mode encryption.
cess rate is low. In the white-box attacks, the attack success
rate significantly increases since the adversary can generate
high-quality adversarial examples by using the known model
information [44, 53].
In order to protect the NN models in DL accelerators from
bus snooping attacks, encrypting the data transmitted through
the GDDR bus is important. Existing memory encryption
techniques [65, 77] are widely used in secure CPU systems
to enable secure data transmission through the DDR bus of
CPU memory. However, data security on the GDDR memory
bus for DL accelerators are rarely touched by existing work.
In this following, we first present memory encryption tech-
niques for secure CPUs (§2.3) and then investigate whether
the straightforward solutions that perform CPU memory en-
cryption directly on DL accelerators are efficient (§2.4).
2.3 Memory Encryption
In secure CPUs, the encryption engine of a block cipher
algorithm (e.g., AES [13]) is added in the memory controller
for encrypting and decrypting data. In general, there are two
memory encryption models used for secure CPUs, including
direct encryption and counter mode encryption.
As shown in Figure 2a, in the direct encryption, each cache
line is encrypted by the AES encryption engine before being
written back to the DRAM memory. After being read from
the DRAM memory, each line is decrypted and then put into
the last level cache. However, direct encryption causes high
decryption latency in the critical path of memory accesses in
CPUs. Additionally, direct encryption encrypts all memory
lines by using the same global key, which has a low security
level. Since the same data are always encrypted to the same
ciphertext, it leaves direct encryption vulnerable to dictionary
and retry based attacks [3, 79].
As shown in Figure 2b, in counter mode encryption [41],
a global key, the line address and the per-line counter pass
through the AES encryption engine to generate a one-time
pad (OTP). The plaintext or ciphertext is then encrypted or
decrypted by simply XORing its OTP. Each memory line in
the off-chip DRAM has a counter. All counters are stored
in the DRAM. Recently used counters are buffered in an on-
chip counter cache managed by the memory controller. If the
counter of a memory line to be read is in the counter cache,
its decryption latency is hidden in the memory read latency,
since the OTP is generated in parallel with the memory read.
Only the XOR latency is added to the critical path, thus
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reducing the decryption latency.
Moreover, counter mode encryption provides a higher secu-
rity level than direct encryption, since OTPs are never reused
for data encryption which keep counter mode encryption se-
cure from dictionary and retry based attacks. First, since the
line address is used to generate the OTP, the data stored at
different addresses are encrypted by different OTPs. Second,
a per-line counter is used to generate the OTP and the counter
increases one on each write. Data rewritten in the same ad-
dress are encrypted by different OTPs. In general, counters
are stored in the plaintext since data cannot be decrypted if
an adversary has the knowledge of the counter value but does
not know the key [41, 79].
2.4 Straightforward Solutions for Securing DL
Accelerators
We consider two straightforward solutions, i.e., simply em-
ploying the direct encryption and counter mode encryption
in DL accelerators, to improve the security of NN models.
Without loss of generality, in the rest of this paper, we analyze
GPU as a representative example of DL accelerators. How-
ever, the problems, insights, and solutions that we develop
are also applicable to other DL accelerators.
We implement the two straightforward solutions in GPGPU-
Sim [5]. Since the encryption engine increases the chip
area and energy overhead that also affects the chip cool-
ing [4,45,54], each memory controller generally includes one
encryption engine [3, 43, 77, 79]. Thus the six memory con-
trollers in the modeled GPU include six encryption engines.
For the counter mode encryption, we add an on-chip counter
cache to buffer recently used counters. The detailed GPU
configurations are shown in Section 4.1. We use the modeled
GPU to execute matrix multiplication computation that is the
most common operation in DL algorithms. We evaluate the
IPC (instruction per cycle) of the GPU with different encryp-
tion schemes and compare them with a baseline GPU without
using memory encryption, as shown in Figure 3a.
First, we observe the GPU with memory encryption is
significantly less efficient than the GPU without memory
encryption. Memory encryption decreases the GPU IPC
by 45%− 54% for the matrix multiplication computation.
Second, using the counter mode encryption scheme does
not deliver higher performance compared to using the direct
encryption scheme on GPU. With the small counter cache
sizes, i.e., 24KB, 96KB, and 384KB, the performance of
Table 1: Bandwidth comparisons of AES encryption en-
gine and different buses [26, 45, 52].
DDR bus DDR3 (No.800−2666) 6.4∼ 21.3 GB/sDDR4 (No.1600−3200) 12.8∼ 25.6 GB/s
PCIe bus PCIe 3.0 (×8 links) 8 GB/sPCIe 3.0 (×16 links) 16 GB/s
AES engine 128bit block 1.5∼ 19 GB/s
GDDR bus GDDR5 160∼ 336 GB/sGDDR5X 320∼ 484 GB/s
the counter mode encryption scheme is even lower than the
direct encryption scheme. By using a large counter cache, i.e.,
1536KB, the IPC of the GPU is improved by 15%. However,
the counter cache size is double of the L2 cache size in the
modeled GPU as shown in the configurations (Section 4.1),
which is too large to be deployed on the GPU die.
The reason that memory encryption significantly reduces
the GPU performance is the big bandwidth gap between the
GDDR memory bus and the encryption engine, as shown
in Table 1. In CPU systems, memory encryption works
well [65, 77] since the AES encryption engine has a simi-
lar bandwidth to the DDR memory bus and the PCIe bus of
CPU. However, in GPU systems, the GPU performance is
highly bandwidth-bounded and hence the GDDR memory is
designed for GPUs to achieve high memory access bandwidth.
The bandwidth of the GDDR memory bus is generally more
than 160GB/s [49, 50, 51, 52]. However, the state-of-the-art
pipelined AES encryption engine with hardware implementa-
tion achieves only about 8GB/s of bandwidth on average [45].
Even though we deploy one encryption engine in every mem-
ory controller, the total encryption bandwidth is 48 GB/s. As
a result, the high bandwidth of the GDDR memory bus is
under-utilized and the AES encryption engine becomes the
bandwidth bottleneck in secure GPUs. A single AES engine
usually occupies over 1 mm2 on-die area and has hundreds or
thousands of mW power, as shown in Table 2. As resources
on the microprocessor die are very scarce, it is ruinously
costly to integrate more encryption engines into memory con-
trollers on the GPU die [21]. Even though a GPU/CPU die
usually has an area of 90−600 mm2, most area is occupied
by cores and on-die memory and only less than 10% area is
left to memory controllers [34, 59]. This is also the reason
why Intel carefully designs the AES hardware implementa-
tion to reduce area and energy overheads for Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) [21]. Like the design principle of Intel’s
SGX [21] and many previous works [3, 43, 77, 79], the goal
of this paper is also to improve the hardware security while
having low on-die overheads. Moreover, since the data access
bandwidth is the performance bottleneck, the counter mode
encryption incurs extra memory access requests for reading
and writing counters compared with the direct encryption,
thus delivering low performance with small cache sizes.
3. THE SEAL DESIGN
We propose SEAL, a secure and efficient DL accelera-
tor scheme to enhance the security of NN models. SEAL
improves the performance of secure DL accelerators by ex-
ploring and exploiting software and hardware co-design. In
the software layer, to improve the data access bandwidth of
DL accelerators, a criticality-aware smart encryption (SE)
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Figure 4: The CNN architecture of VGG-16 as an example. (The CNN uses an image with 224×224 pixels and 3 channels
as the input layer and outputs a one-dimensional vector. The input and output of each hidden layer are called feature maps
(FMs) and output FMs of the previous layer are input FMs of the latter layer. (CONV: 3×3, 64) indicates a convolution layer
with the 3×3 CONV kernel and 64 output channels. (FM: 224×224×64) means the FMs with the size of 224×224×64.
POOL indicates a pooling later and FC indicates a full connected layer.
Table 2: Performance comparisons of different AES en-
cryption engine implementations (counter mode).
Area
(mm2)
Power
(mW)
Latency
(cycle)
Throughput
(GB/s)
Morioka et al. [46] N/A 1920 10 1.5
Mathew et al. [45] 1.1 125 20 6.6
Ensilica [15] 1.4 N/A 11 8
Sayilar et al. [62] 6.3 6207 20 16
Liu et al. [42] 6.6 1580 152 19
scheme (§3.1) is used to measure the relative importance of
weight parameters in the NN model. Only the relatively im-
portant weight parameters are processed by the AES encryp-
tion engine and the remaining parameters bypass the AES
encryption engine, which reduces the amount of data to be en-
crypted without compromising the security. We quantitatively
analyze and evaluate the security of the SE scheme in terms
of both IP protection and adversarial attacks, and leverage
the evaluation results to guide the parameter configuration of
the SE scheme to obtain the maximum performance benefit
and the highest security level (§3.4). In the hardware layer,
to improve the efficiency of memory encryption, SEAL lever-
ages a colocation mode encryption (ColoE) scheme (§3.2) to
achieve the same security level as the counter mode encryp-
tion while eliminating extra memory accesses from counters.
Moreover, we present the overall hardware architecture de-
sign to support SE and ColoE (§3.3).
3.1 Criticality-aware Smart Encryption
In this subsection, we first use the convolutional neural
network (CNN) that is a widely used neural network for DL
as an example to present the challenges of performing partial
encryption on DL accelerators. We then present the proposed
criticality-aware smart encryption scheme.
3.1.1 Challenges for Partial Encryption
During the process of the CNN inference, there are four
kinds of data, i.e., data in the input layer, data in the output
layer, weight parameters in hidden layers (i.e., the NN model
data), and intermediate data (i.e., feature maps) produced by
hidden layers, as shown in Figure 4. If we encrypt all the data
during the CNN inference, the inference performance signifi-
cantly decreases, as presented in Section 2.4. This is mainly
because the bandwidth of the AES encryption engine is far
lower than that of the GDDR memory bus, limiting the total
data access bandwidth. If we can only encrypt partial data
to reduce the amount of data to be encrypted, the total data
access bandwidth improves. Nevertheless, performing par-
tial encryption is not easy due to the following fundamental
challenges.
Challenge 1: How to select appropriate data to be en-
crypted? Among the four kinds of data, the data in the input
and output layers are usually known by the adversary. For
example, for the DL accelerator in a self-driving car, the in-
put data are the pictures of the current visual field taken by
cameras, which can be obtained by the adversary. The output
data are the current actions of the car, e.g., stop, turning left,
or turning right, also known by the adversary. A simple way
of the partial encryption is that we do not encrypt the data in
the input and output layers and encrypt the remaining data
including weight parameters in the NN model and intermedi-
ate data produced by hidden layers. However, the sizes of the
data in the input and output layers are far smaller than that of
the intermediate data, as shown in Figure 4. For example, the
data in the input layer with the size of 224×224×3 are 11
times smaller than the output feature maps of the first CONV
layer with the size of 224×224×64. Therefore, this simple
way is inefficient to improve inference performance.
Moreover, among these data in the CNN inference, weight
parameters of the NN model have to be protected. Intuitively,
we can encrypt only the weight parameters of the NN model
and do not encrypt the remainder of the data to reduce the
encryption overhead. However, an adversary can calculate or
speculate the weight parameters of the NN model via unen-
crypted feature maps. For example, a CONV layer computes
the input feature maps X with a kernel matrix ω to produce
the output feature maps Y , i.e., Y = Xω . If X and Y are
not encrypted, an adversary can easily compute the kernel
matrix ω via the equation ω = X−1Y in which X−1 is the
inverse matrix of X . Therefore, it is important to protect the
NN model data from being calculated or speculated from the
unencrypted data.
Challenge 2: How to evaluate the impact of partial en-
cryption on security? Intuitively, encrypting all data inputted
and produced during the NN inference has a high security
level but causes significant performance degradation. Selec-
tively un-encrypting partial data can improve the performance
which however may exacerbate security. An adversary can
directly compute encrypted weights via unencrypted feature
maps as discussed above. Moreover, existing fine-tuning tech-
niques [39, 58] for NN models can also be used to speculate
a complete NN model based on known partial weight param-
eters and the data in the input and output layers. Specifically,
the adversary can fill the known partial weight parameters in
the NN model and then use the data in the input and output
layers to retain a complete NN model. Hence, how to evalu-
ate and quantify the impact of partial encryption on security
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is non-trivial for designing an efficient encryption scheme.
3.1.2 Smart Encryption in SEAL
To address these challenges, we propose a criticality-aware
smart encryption (SE) scheme in SEAL, which aims to reduce
the amount of encrypted data while improving the NN model
security. The SE scheme quantitatively measures the relative
importance of weight parameters in each layer by calculating
the sum of their absolute weights, i.e., `1-norm. The weight
parameters with the smallest absolute values in each layer are
considered to be least important and hence are not encrypted.
Thus it is unnecessary to encrypt the corresponding channels
in the input or output feature maps of unencrypted weight
parameters. As a result, the amount of data to be encrypted is
significantly reduced. The percentage of un-encrypted weight
parameters is determined based on the quantitative security
evaluation in Section 3.4 to obtain maximum performance
benefit and highest security level.
In deep neural networks, we consider use the SE scheme
in the CONV layers since most layers in a CNN model are
CONV layers, e.g., 13/16 for VGG-16, 17/18 for ResNet-
18, and 33/34 for ResNet-34. The computation process of
a CONV layer is shown in Figure 5. Weight parameters
in a CONV layer are organized as a convolutional kernel
matrix, and each convolutional kernel is a weight matrix,
e.g., 3×3. The computation of a CONV layer transforms the
input feature maps with the convolutional kernel matrix to the
output feature maps. The convolutional kernel matrix has nx
kernel rows and ny kernel columns. nx is equal to the number
of channels in the input feature maps. Each kernel row in
the kernel matrix corresponds to a single input channel in the
input feature maps and this input channel does not involve the
convolution computation with other kernel rows, as shown in
Figure 5. Similarly, ny is equal to the number of channels in
the output feature maps. Each kernel column in the kernel
matrix corresponds to a single output channel in the output
feature maps, as shown in Figure 5.
Relative Importance Measurement. We first present our
approach for relative importance measurement as shown in
Figure 5. We measure the relative importance of a kernel row
in each layer by calculating the sum of its absolute weights,
i.e., `1-norm. The sum of absolute weights in a row also repre-
sents the average magnitude of the kernel weights which gives
an expectation of the magnitude of the output feature map.
Thus kernel rows with smaller sums of absolute weights tend
to produce feature maps with weak activations, compared
with the other kernel rows in the same layer [39]. Hence,
these rows with small absolute-value sums have a lower im-
pact on the output of the entire NN model compared with the
rows with large absolute-value sums. Existing work [23, 39]
on pruning NN models demonstrate that, even after com-
pletely eliminating the convolution computation that uses
these weight parameters with small absolute values, the origi-
nal accuracy of the NN model can be regained by retraining
the networks. This observation indicates that these weight pa-
rameters with small absolute values are less important to the
NN model and thus rarely affect the security of the NN model.
We have confirmed this conjecture by performing IP protec-
tion and adversarial attack tests as presented in Section 3.4,
whose results motivate us to propose the smart encryption
(SE) scheme to reduce the encryption overhead in DL accel-
Kernel Matrix
r1
Kernel Matrix
X
W
Y
W’
hx
wx
hy
wy
r3
Figure 5: An example for the smart encryption scheme.
(Green areas: encrypted data. Each grid in the kernel matrix
is a kernel, e.g., 3*3.)
erators by only encrypting the weight parameters with large
absolute values.
Smart Encryption (SE). After computing the sum of ab-
solute weights in each row, the SE scheme sorts the kernel
rows based on their sums. The SE scheme then encrypts
partial kernel rows with the largest sums. The percentage of
the encrypted kernel rows is determined by our quantitative
security analysis as shown in Section 3.4. However, the en-
crypted weight parameters in the SE scheme can be figured
out if the input and output feature maps of this CONV layer
are unencrypted as discussed in Section 3.1.1. Therefore,
for each encrypted row, the SE scheme also encrypts one
input channel in the input feature maps corresponding to the
encrypted row, since each kernel row corresponds to a single
input channel and does not involve the convolution computa-
tion with other input channels, as shown in Figure 5. In this
way, the encrypted weight parameters cannot be figured out.
For example, for the matrix multiplication Y = Xω , the input
channel X and the weights ω are encrypted. ω cannot be
figured out even though the adversary knows Y . The data in
the input channel X is encrypted once being produced by the
previous CONV layer. Hence, the plaintext in the encrypted
channel X is never exposed to the memory bus.
Moreover, when considering unencrypted data among mul-
tiple layers, the encrypted channels and weights cannot be
figured out and hence also secure. To prove this, we use a sim-
ple example with two sequential CONV layers, i.e., Y = Xω
and Z = Yω ′ , as follows.
X =
[
X 0 X1
]
,ω =
[
ω r0
ωr1
]
=
[
ω 00 ω 01
ω10 ω11
]
,Y =
[
Y0 Y 1
]
,
ω
′
=
[
ω ′r0
ω ′r1
]
=
[
ω ′00 ω
′
01
ω ′10 ω
′
11
]
,Z =
[
Z0 Z1
]
(1)
The feature maps X, Y, and Z have 2 channels. Since there
are 2 input and output channels, the kernel matrixes ω and
ω ′ have 2 rows and 2 columns. With a 50% encryption
ratio, we assume the first row ωr0 in ω is encrypted, and the
second row ω ′r1 in ω
′
is encrypted. Based on the SE scheme,
we should encrypt the first channel X0 in X and the second
channel Y1 in Y . Moreover, we assume Z0 is encrypted in Z.
In Equation 1, the bold fonts mean encrypted data. Thus for
the two sequential CONV layers, we can have the following
equations (the encrypted data are in bold):{
X 0 ∗ω 00 +X1 ∗ω10 = Y0
X 0 ∗ω 01 +X1 ∗ω11 = Y 1 (2){
Y0 ∗ω ′00 +Y 1 ∗ω
′
10 = Z0
Y0 ∗ω ′01 +Y 1 ∗ω
′
11 = Z1
(3)
As shown in Equations 2 and 3, encrypted input channels
are never multiplied with unencrypted weight rows, and un-
encrypted input channels are never multiplied with encrypted
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Figure 6: The comparisons between counter and coloca-
tion mode encryption schemes.
weight rows. Thus we can only obtain the product of two
encrypted matrixes, e.g., X0 ∗ω00, but cannot figure out any
single encrypted matrix from Equations 2 and 3. Therefore,
the data in encrypted channels and weights are secure even
considering data among multiple layers.
In fact, the SE scheme can also be applied to FC lay-
ers since each FC layer includes a kernel matrix like the
CONV layer. Therefore, the proposed SE scheme can be
applied to other deep neural networks, e.g., recurrent neural
networks [12, 28], that are composed of many FC layers.
3.2 Colocation Mode Encryption
There are two existing memory encryption models, i.e.,
direct encryption and counter mode encryption, as discussed
in Section 2.3. Direct encryption has a lower security level
due to being vulnerable to the directory and retry based at-
tacks. Counter mode encryption enhances security by using
counters for encryption but requires a large counter cache
on chip to achieve a high cache hit rate. Based on previ-
ous works [3, 43, 77] on counter mode encryption, the size
of the used counter cache is usually up to 1MB−4MB. It
is reasonable to add a large counter cache on CPU chips,
since a large part of the area on CPU chips is occupied by
memories, e.g., last level cache, and thus it is easy to par-
tition some memories for the counter cache. However, for
DL accelerators, especially GPUs, a large part of the on-chip
area is used for computing units. The L2 cache for current
commercial GPUs [2, 50, 51] is usually no more than several
MB. Therefore, adding a large counter cache on GPU chips
is unpractical.
Our paper proposes a colocation mode encryption (ColoE)
scheme for DL accelerators without using an on-chip counter
cache. The ColoE scheme achieves the same security level
while having higher performance on DL accelerators, com-
pared with the traditional counter mode encryption. Unlike
the traditional counter mode encryption that stores the data
and their counters separately as shown in Figure 6a, the ColoE
scheme stores the data and its counter together, i.e., coloca-
tion. Like Intel’s SGX [21,22], we use the monolithic counter
scheme rather than the split counter scheme [77] to avoid the
overheads of intricate page re-encryption. The counter area is
8B for each memory line. Thus a memory line for storing the
encrypted data is 136B including 128B data and 8B counter
area as shown in Figure 6b. When the data is evicted from
the L2 cache, the ColoE scheme encrypts the data using its
co-located counter, its memory address, and a key and then
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Figure 7: A high-level overview of the SEAL architec-
ture. (This figure shows one memory controller and the other
controllers are the same as this one.)
writes it into the DRAM memory. When the data is read
from the DRAM memory, the ColoE scheme decrypts the
data and then sends it to the L2 cache. Unlike the traditional
counter mode encryption that needs extra memory accesses to
read/write counters, the ColoE scheme avoids these memory
requests from counters by co-locating the data and their coun-
ters, thus improving the encryption performance in GPUs.
3.3 Implementation and Overall Architecture
To support the proposed SE and ColoE schemes, SEAL is
implemented via exploring and exploiting software and hard-
ware co-design. The implementation and overall architecture
of SEAL are shown in Figure 7.
To support the SE scheme, in the software layer, we expose
a new programming primitive, emalloc(), to the high-level
program in order to allow programmers to leverage the ben-
efits of the smart encryption. The memory space allocated
by emalloc() needs to be encrypted. The memory space
allocated by existing malloc() in current programming lan-
guages does not need to be encrypted. In the hardware layer,
the counter area is 64 bits while the counter used in the
counter mode encryption only needs 56 bits, like the imple-
mentation in Intel’s SGX [21, 22]. Thus 8 bits in the counter
area are not used. We use one bit in the counter area of each
memory line as a flag to indicate whether the memory line
is allocated by emalloc() or malloc(). Hence, memory
controllers can distinguish the memory lines allocated by
emalloc() or malloc() based on the flags. Memory lines
allocated by malloc() bypass the AES engine.
To support the ColoE scheme, referring to the design of
error-correcting code (ECC) DRAM [8, 14], we design the
DRAM DIMM to include an extra chip without changing the
DRAM burst mechanism. As shown in Figure 7, in a DRAM
rank, there are 16 data chips and 1 counter chip (in the ECC
DRAM, the chip is used for storing ECC bits). For a memory
line, 128B data is stored in the 16 data chips (8B per chip)
and 8B counter area is stored in the counter chip.
3.4 Security Analysis
For the security analysis, we first discuss the case where
an adversary does not know what NN architecture is used
in the target DL accelerator. In this case, even though some
NN model data are obtained by the bus snooping attack, the
adversary is difficult to distinguish which data are used for
a particular layer. In our proposed SE scheme, some data
are encrypted and hence it is more difficult for the adversary
to recover the NN model. Therefore, we consider a strong
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Figure 8: The inference accuracy of substitute models.
attack model in which an adversary is able to figure out
the NN architecture in the DL accelerator via side channel
information [29,30,78],e.g., memory access patterns obtained
from the memory bus, or device specifications [32]. In this
case, the adversary can distinguish the data from different
layers and know the locations in the NN model where the
encrypted and unencrypted data correspond to. Under the
strong attack model, we below present the security analysis.
The security of NN models involves two aspects including IP
stealing and adversarial attacks, as presented in Section 2.2.
3.4.1 Substitute Model Generation
In the security evaluation tests, we use three classical
CNN models including VGG-16 [67], ResNet-18 [25], and
ResNet-34 [25] and train them on the widely used CIFAR-10
dataset [35]. The NN model stored in the target DL accel-
erator is called victim model, and the NN model that the ad-
versary extracts from the accelerator by using bus-snooping
attacks is called substitute model. Based on the fact that the
adversary does not know the training dataset of the victim
model, we isolate 90% of training samples (45,000 images)
in CIFAR10 as the training dataset of the victim model [56].
The remaining 10% of training samples (5,000 images) are
used by the adversary. Based on the 5,000 images, the ad-
versary uses Jacobian-based dataset augmentation [56] to
generate additional 40,000 images and then query them in the
target accelerator to obtain their corresponding labels. The
generated image-label pairs are used as the training dataset
of the adversary’s substitute models. There are three kinds of
substitute models that the adversary may obtain as follows.
• White-box model. If a DL accelerator does not equip
memory encryption, the adversary can know the entire victim
model including all weight parameters and the NN architec-
ture. Thus we consider an NN model that is the same as the
victim model as the white-box substitute model.
• Black-box model. If we encrypt all the victim model data
and intermediate data, the adversary knows the NN archi-
tecture but does not know any weight parameters. However,
the adversary can feed his/her own images into the target DL
accelerator and obtain the output label. By using the image-
label pairs, the adversary is able to retrain an NN model with
the same architecture as the victim model. We consider the
retrained NN model as the black-box substitute model.
• Smart encryption (SE) models. In the SEAL, we se-
lectively encrypt partial data that are critical and thus the
adversary knows the NN architecture and partial weight pa-
rameters that are unencrypted. We perform full encryption on
the first two CONV layers, the last one CONV layer, and the
last FC layers of a CNN model to prevent the adversary from
calculating the weight parameters via input and output layers,
and perform the SE scheme on the remaining weight layers.
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Figure 9: The transferability of adversarial attacks for
different substitute models.
However, by using inputs and outputs of the target DL accel-
erator, the adversary is able to supplement the unknown part
of weight parameters via retraining the NN. Specifically, the
adversary initializes an NN model with known weight param-
eters and fills random numbers following a standard normal
distribution for unknown weight parameters [24]. The ad-
versary then keeps the known weight parameters unchanged
and fine-tunes unknown weight parameters by retraining the
NN using inputs and outputs of the target DL accelerator.
Note that the attacker can know the information that the
sums of unknown weight rows must be larger than those of
known weight rows and then leverage this information during
fine-tuning. However, in our experiments, we observe the
generated substitute models leveraging the information do not
perform better, since limiting the sums of unknown weight
rows may destroy efficient parameter fine-tuning.
3.4.2 Security on IP Stealing
One of the attack purposes is to steal the IP of NN models.
The adversary that may be a business competitor aims to
reduce the competitive advantages of model owners. The effi-
ciency of the stolen attacks depends on the inference accuracy
of the extracted substitute models. In the stolen attack tests,
we first generate the three kinds of substitute models includ-
ing white-box, black-box, and SE models that the adversary
may obtain as mentioned above. For the SE models, we vary
the encryption ratio from 90% to 10%. The encryption ratio
is defined as the ratio of encrypted weight parameters to all
weight parameters in each layer. The encrypted weights have
the largest absolute weight values in each layer as presented
in Section 3.1.2. We evaluate the inference accuracy of these
substitute models using test samples of the victim model.
Figure 8 shows their inference accuracy. We observe that
the while-box model has a very high accuracy, i.e., about 94%,
due to being the same as the victim model. The black-box
model significantly reduces the accuracy from 94% to 75%.
This is because the adversary does not know any weights
and training samples in the victim model, and the black-box
model can only be trained from a blank model by using
the adversary’s training dataset. For the SE models, when
the encryption ratio is only 20%, the accuracy significantly
decreases by 14% on average (from 94% to 80%), since the
weight parameters with the largest absolutes are encrypted in
SE models. When the encryption ratios ≥ 40%, the accuracy
is almost the same as that of the black-box model. It means
the SEAL with a ≥ 40% encryption ratio achieves the same
security level as the black-box model for IP protection.
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3.4.3 Security on Adversarial Attacks
If the purpose is to attack the victim model, the adver-
sary can use the extracted NN models to generate adversarial
examples and then use the adversarial examples to perform
adversarial attacks. In the adversarial attacks, the adversary
aims to add the minimum perturbation on the input to mis-
lead the victim model to produce a pre-assigned incorrect
output [1, 37, 69]. In the adversarial attack tests, we use the
three kinds of substitute models including white-box, black-
box, and SE models to respectively generate 1,000 adversarial
examples via the I-FGSM method [37]. Each batch of 1,000
adversarial examples have a 100% attack success rate to at-
tack their corresponding substitute models. We then use these
adversarial examples to attack the victim model and evaluate
the transferability of adversarial examples. The transferabil-
ity is defined as the ratio of the adversarial examples that
successfully attack the victim model to all adversarial exam-
ples, which is a widely used metric to evaluate the efficiency
of substitute models for adversarial attacks [17, 44, 71, 80].
Figure 9 shows the transferability of the adversarial examples
generated by different substitute models.
We observe that black-box models have much low transfer-
ability (about 20%) for the three CNN models compared with
while-box models, since the adversary with black-box models
does not know any weight parameters and training samples
of the victim model. For the SE models, when the encryption
ratios ≥ 50% for the three CNN models, the transferability
is close to, and even smaller than those of black-box mod-
els. The reason is that the unencrypted weight parameters
in the SE scheme are relatively un-important because they
have the smallest absolute weights in each layer. If the adver-
sary keeps the unencrypted weight parameters unchanged and
fine-tunes the remaining weight parameters, the unchanged,
unimportant weight parameters may disturb the retrained
model, thus producing smaller attack success rates than the
black-box model. When the encryption ratios < 40%, the
transferability rapidly increases since some important weight
parameters with large absolutes are exposed to the adversary.
Based on the above results, we set the encryption ratio of
the SE scheme to 50%, which obtains the maximum perfor-
mance benefit when achieving the same security level as the
black-box models.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
4.1 Methodology
We evaluate the performance of SEAL using the GPGPU-
Sim v3.2.2 [5], a cycle-level simulator for contemporary
GPUs. We model the microarchitecture for NVIDIA GeForce
GTX480 GPU [49] with 15 streaming multiprocessors (SMs),
one of the default GPUs in GPGPU-Sim. The details of our
used GPU configuration are shown in Table 3. Although
we perform our simulations on an Nvidia Fermi GPU, our
solution focusing on the accelerator memory system is also
applicable and generalizable to newer GPU architectures
including Maxwell, Pascal, and Volta, as well as other kinds
of DL accelerators as presented in Section 2.4. To implement
SEAL, we add an AES encryption engine in every memory
controller of the simulated GPU. We model a pipeline AES
encryption engine with 128-bit block [4, 45, 54], in which the
Table 3: Configurations of the simulated system.
GPU Core
Number of SMs 15
Core clock 700 MHz
Number of warps per SM 48
Register file size per SM 128KB (32768 registers)
Register file cache size per SM 16KB (4096 registers)
Shared memory size per SM 48KB
Cache and Memory
Private L1 cache 16KB, 4-way, 128B line, 1-cycle latency
Shared L2 cache 768KB, 8-way, 128B line, 10-cycle latency
Memory model GDDR5, 1848 MHz (3696 data rate),384-bit bus width, 6 channels, FR-FCFS
GDDR5 timing (ns) tCL = 12, tRP = 12, tRC = 40,tRAS = 28, tRCD = 12, tRRD = 6
overall AES encryption latency for a cache line is 20 cycles
and the bandwidth of an AES engine is 8GB/s. According
to bandwidth values summarized in Tables 1 and 2, we set a
mean bandwidth value for AES and GPU.
Benchmarks. We use three classical CNN models includ-
ing VGG-16 [67], ResNet-18 [25], and ResNet-34 [25]. In
order to run these CNN models on GPGPU-Sim, we install
the PyTorch for GPGPU-Sim [57], an open-source modi-
fied version of PyTorch that enables GPGPU-Sim to use the
cuDNN library [48].
Comparisons. We compare SEAL with the five schemes.
• Baseline: An insecure GPU without memory encryp-
tion as the baseline.
• Direct: A straightforward solution using the direct
encryption scheme as presented in Section 2.4.
• Counter: A straightforward solution using the counter
mode encryption scheme as presented in Section 2.4.
For the counter mode encryption scheme, we add an
on-chip counter cache whose size is 1/16 (equal to the
counter/data size ratio, i.e., 8B/128B) of the L2 cache.
• Direct+SE: The direct encryption scheme with our pro-
posed criticality-aware smart encryption (SE) scheme.
We compare the performance of Direct and Direct+SE
to show the benefit of the SE scheme.
• Counter+SE: The counter mode encryption scheme
with our proposed SE scheme. We compare the perfor-
mance of Counter and Counter+SE to show the ben-
efit of the SE scheme. We also compare Counter+SE
with SEAL to show the benefit of our proposed coloca-
tion mode encryption (ColoE) scheme.
4.2 Performance of Different Layers
4.2.1 IPC of Different-layer Computation
We perform the SE scheme on CONV layers whose input
and output feature maps are also the input and output of
POOL layers. Different encryption schemes have different
impacts on the performance of CONV and POOL layers.
The default encryption ratio is 50% for the SE scheme as
presented in Section 3.4. To investigate the impact of different
encryption schemes on the performance of different layers,
we evaluate four typical CONV layers in VGG, in which the
number of input and output channels is 64, 128, 256, and 512,
respectively. We also evaluate the five different POOL layers.
Figure 10 shows the relative IPCs of different encryp-
tion schemes when computing these CONV layers. We
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Figure 10: The IPC of different encryption schemes nor-
malized to that of a baseline GPU for CONV layers.
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Figure 11: The IPC of different encryption schemes nor-
malized to that of a baseline GPU for POOL layers.
observe that the Direct scheme and the Counter scheme re-
duce the GPU IPC by up to 40% compared with the base-
line GPU without memory encryption. The reason is that
memory encryption significantly reduces the data access
bandwidth in GPUs as discussed in Section 2.4. By com-
paring the performance between the Direct/Counter and the
Direct+SE/Counter+SE schemes, our proposed SE scheme
significantly improves the memory encryption performance
on GPUs by reducing the amount of the encrypted data to
improve the data access bandwidth without compromising
security. The Direct+SE scheme has higher IPC performance
than the Counter+SE scheme, since the counter mode en-
cryption causes extra memory accesses from counters. How-
ever, the direct encryption has a lower security level than the
counter mode encryption. SEAL leverages a ColoE scheme
to achieve the same security level as counter mode encryption
while delivering higher performance. Compared with the
Counter+SE scheme, we observe that SEAL improves the
IPC by up to 12% by using the ColoE scheme.
Figure 11 shows the relative IPCs of different encryption
schemes when computing POOL layers. We observe the
Direct and Counter schemes reduce the IPC by up to 50%,
and perform worse in comparison to computing CONV layers
since the computation of POOL layers is more bandwidth-
bounded than that of CONV layers. Due to the same reason,
the Direct+SE, Counter+SE, and SEAL perform worse when
compared to computing CONV layers. Nevertheless, for the
entire neural network, the amount of computation overhead
in CONV layers is much larger than that in POOL layers.
4.2.2 Performance under Different Encr. Ratios
We investigate the impact of different encryption ratios on
the performance of SEAL when computing a CONV/POOL
layer. We vary the encryption ratio from 100% to 0% with
the 10% interval. A 100% encryption ratio means a full-
encryption GPU. When the encryption ratio is 0%, the perfor-
mance is the same as that of a baseline GPU without memory
encryption. The experimental results are shown in Figure 12.
When slightly reducing the encryption ratio by 20%−30%
from a 100% encryption ratio, the IPC is significantly im-
proved. The reason is that allowing partial data to bypass
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Figure 12: The IPC of SEAL with different encryption
ratios normalized to that of a baseline GPU.
the AES encryption engine not only improves the data access
bandwidth of the GPU but also reduces the competition for
the use of the encryption engine. When the encryption ratio
is reduced to 50%, the IPC is improved from 65% to 95%
and from 54% to 87% for computing the CONV and POOL
layers respectively, compared with a 100% encryption ratio.
4.3 Overall Performance
4.3.1 IPC
We evaluate the IPC of the GPU with different encryption
schemes when executing the NN inference using VGG-16,
ResNet-18, and ResNet-34, as shown in Figure 13. Tradi-
tional memory encryption solutions including the Direct and
Counter schemes reduce the GPU IPC for executing NN
inference by 30%− 38%, compared with a baseline GPU.
Moreover, the Direct and Counter schemes deliver higher
performance in ResNets than those in VGG. The reason is
that the amounts of computation and data accesses to memory
in VGG are much larger than those in ResNets [25] and thus
VGG requires higher data access bandwidth. Memory en-
cryption limits the data access bandwidth and hence has more
significant impact on the performance of VGG. By using our
proposed SE scheme to allow some data to bypass the AES
encryption engine, the Direct+SE and Counter+SE schemes
improve the IPC by about 31% and 20% respectively, com-
pared with the Direct and Counter schemes. By using our
proposed ColoE scheme to eliminate memory accesses of
counters, SEAL further improves the IPC by about 7% com-
pared with the Counter+SE scheme. As a result, compared
with the traditional memory encryption solutions, i.e., the Di-
rect and Counter schemes, SEAL achieves 1.4×−1.6× IPC
improvement. Moreover, SEAL achieves the 93%−95% IPC
of a baseline GPU without memory encryption, i.e., compro-
mising only 5%−7% performance for security improvement.
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Figure 13: The IPC normalized to that of a baseline GPU.
4.3.2 The Number of Memory Accesses
We evaluate the number of different kinds of memory ac-
cesses when using different encryption schemes, as shown
in Figure 14. For the baseline GPU, all memory accesses
including reads and writes come from unencrypted data. For
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Figure 14: The number of memory accesses normalized
to that of a baseline GPU.
the Direct scheme, all memory accesses are from encrypted
data and thus need to pass through the low-bandwidth AES
encryption engine. Therefore, the Direct scheme significantly
reduces the GPU performance compared with the Baseline as
shown in Figure 13. For the Counter scheme, all memory ac-
cesses from data are also from encrypted data. Moreover, the
Counter scheme incurs 31%−35% more memory accesses
from counters and thus has lower performance than the Direct
scheme. Nevertheless, in the Direct and Counter schemes, the
main performance bottleneck is the AES encryption engine
rather than the DRAM. Hence, extra memory accesses from
counters in Counter scheme do not incur much performance
decrease, compared with the Direct scheme.
By using the SE scheme, the number of memory accesses
from encrypted data is reduced by 39%−45%. Therefore, the
IPCs of Direct+SE and Counter+SE schemes are significantly
improved compared with the Direct and Counter schemes,
as shown in Figure 13. Moreover, the Counter+SE scheme
incurs about 20% more memory accesses from counters and
thus has lower performance than the Direct+SE scheme. Nev-
ertheless, in the Direct+SE and Counter+SE schemes, the
AES encryption engine may not be the main performance
bottleneck due to using the SE scheme. Therefore, extra
20% memory accesses from counters in Counter scheme in-
cur much performance decrease, compared with the Direct
scheme. SEAL leverages the ColoE scheme to achieve the
same security level as counter mode encryption while elimi-
nating the extra memory accesses from counters. Therefore,
compared with the Direct+SE scheme, SEAL achieves higher
security level and the approximate performance. Compared
with the Counter+SE scheme, SEAL achieves higher perfor-
mance and the same security level.
4.3.3 Inference Latency
We investigate the impact of different encryption schemes
on the inference latency, as shown in Figure 15. Tradi-
tional memory encryption solutions including the Direct and
Counter schemes increase the inference latency by 39%−
60%, compared to a baseline GPU. By using the proposed
SE scheme, the Direct+SE and Counter+SE schemes reduce
the extra inference latency to 5%−18%. By using both the
SE and ColoE schemes, SEAL incurs only 5%−7% higher
inference latency than the baseline GPU.
5. RELATED WORK
Model Extraction Attacks. 1) Algorithm layer. There
exist algorithm-layer approaches to extract the NN model re-
lated information by exploiting the inputs and outputs of the
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Figure 15: The inference latency normalized to that of a
baseline GPU.
DL inference. Tramèr el al. [72] assume that the confidence
scores of the classification labels produced by DL systems
and the NN model architecture are known and demonstrate
that some model parameters can be speculated. Oh et al. [53]
assume the model architecture is unknown and propose a
metamodel approach to extract the information of the NN
model architecture. Wang et al. [74] propose an approach to
extract the hyperparameters of the NN model. The hyperpa-
rameters are usually used to balance between the regulariza-
tion terms in the objective function and the loss function. 2)
System and architecture layers. Existing works exploit the
information of the operating system and architecture layers
to speculate the NN model related information. Naghibijouy-
bari et al. [47] exploit the side channel information in the
operating system, such as memory allocation APIs, GPU per-
formance counters, and timing measurement, to speculate the
NN model related information, e.g., the number of neurons.
Hua et al. [30] exploit the side channel information in the DL
accelerator architecture, e.g., the memory access pattern, to
speculate the NN architecture related information.
The model extraction attacks mentioned above can obtain
only a small part of the NN model related information. Com-
pared with these model extraction attacks, the bus snooping
attacks for DL accelerators that our paper focuses on are
much more dangerous. This is because an adversary can
obtain all data of the entire NN model including weight pa-
rameters in each layer by the bus snooping attacks. Our paper
proposes a secure and efficient solution, called SEAL, to
defend against the bus snooping attacks for DL accelerators.
Memory Encryption. Obviously, software memory en-
cryption, such as Graviton [73], cannot adequately defend
against physical access based attacks [77], since the programs
of encryption software themselves can be stored in the mem-
ory. Hardware memory encryption has been widely used in
secure CPU systems [3, 27, 41, 61, 77, 79] to defend against
physical access based attacks by adding the hardware encryp-
tion engine on the CPU chip. Memory encryption does not
cause significant performance degradation in CPU systems,
since the DDR memory bus for CPUs has a similar bandwidth
to the encryption engine. However, memory encryption sig-
nificantly decreases the performance of DL accelerators, e.g.,
GPUs, due to the big bandwidth gap between the GDDR
memory bus and encryption engine. Our proposed SEAL is
able to efficiently address this problem via criticality-aware
smart encryption and colocation mode encryption.
6. CONCLUSION
Our paper proposes SEAL to enhance the security of NN
models in DL accelerators on edge devices. To reduce perfor-
mance overheads from memory encryption, SEAL leverages
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a criticality-aware smart encryption (SE) scheme and a colo-
cation mode encryption (ColoE) scheme. The SE scheme
is used to improve the data access bandwidth of DL accel-
erators by identifying partial data that have no impact on
the security of NN models and allowing them to bypass the
encryption engine without affecting the security of the NN
model. The ColoE scheme is used to improve the efficiency
of memory encryption by co-locating data and their counters
to reduce the memory accesses from counters. Our experi-
mental results show that, compared with traditional memory
encryption solutions, SEAL achieves 1.4×−1.6× IPC im-
provement. Compared with a baseline accelerator without
using memory encryption, SEAL improves the security with
a slight overhead ( 5%−7% IPC).
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